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Abstract 
 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, a policy constructed to address 
and alleviate particular vulnerabilities of women in conflict zones, was adopted over fifteen years 
ago. However, one does not need to look far to see that Syrian women refugees continue to face 
extreme and debilitating forms of suffering as they have been forced to seek refuge in 
neighboring countries. So, why does this gap between policy rhetoric and lived experience 
persist for women in conflict zones? I argue that such systematic perpetuation of violence and 
suffering is attributed to specific and narrow discourses about women in conflict zones from 
which the Resolution is built. Due to the policy’s limited discursive scope on human security and 
vulnerability, UNSC Resolution 1325 informs representations of Syrian women in conflict zones 
that fail to grasp a just, comprehensive assessment of the suffering population’s context. Through 
discourse analysis of reports published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN 
Women), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), particular representations of Syrian 
women will be identified and analyzed in terms of how and to what degree they allow structural 
suffering and violence to continue. In addition to what framings are explicitly represented, 
attention will also be paid to representations that are more implicit or silenced by the 
Resolution’s policy discourse, and how these silences simultaneously feed into persistent 
suffering of the widespread Syrian refugee population. Overall, naming these discursive 
representations will aim to shed light on a presence/absence paradigm that is structurally created 
in international human rights policy. The conclusions will be essential for activists and justice 
leaders to later engage in a genuine, collaborative, and dialogic process that privileges the 
complex, authentic lived human experience in order to inform more cognizant and mindful 
community aid, individual support, and international policy.  
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Introduction 
As described by Tim Dunne, the United Nations (UN) is a “multi-purpose agency dedicated 
to specific goals including collective security, peacekeeping, health, environmental, and human 
rights concerns.”1 One subset of these goals is a focus on protecting and promoting the security 
of women who have experienced armed conflict. The vulnerability and insecurity of women in 
armed conflict zones is a concern that has garnered much attention in the UN in recent decades. 
The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, the Beijing Platform for Action, and UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 are just some UN sources that express concern for women’s 
vulnerability and suffering in conflict zones and in post-conflict rehabilitation. The documents 
outline practices, goals, and benchmarks that encourage implementation of programs to 
explicitly address women’s specific protections and needs in post-conflict humanitarian and 
refugee resettlement efforts. UN agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (UN Women), and international nongovernmental organizations, such as the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC), have dedicated considerable efforts toward translating 
these policy commitments into action. Together, these organizations have devoted resources to 
report on the plight of women in conflict zones and implement programs inspired by policy 
frameworks put forth by the UN. However, despite such extensive rhetorical commitments and 
policy frameworks, women in conflict zones continue to experience considerable suffering.  
Therefore, a fundamental discrepancy appears between the policies and reporting performed 
by these organizations as a collective, and their practical ability to alleviate suffering. In order to 
locate the source of this discrepancy, this thesis asks: how has UNSC Resolution 1325 informed 
                                                
1 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, (2007) International Relations Theories: Discipline 
and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 103.   
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representations of women in conflict zones that have allowed their suffering to continue? I argue 
that UNSC Resolution 1325 was built on a narrow discursive scope on human security and 
vulnerability about women in conflict zones that fail to grasp a just, comprehensive assessment 
of the suffering population’s context which, ultimately, leaves the policy to be mal-equipped to 
uproot systemic suffering post-conflict.  
Chapter 1 will outline the initial development of human security and vulnerability discourses 
within the UN body. In doing so, I will apply discourse development theory in an integrated way 
to the fundamental policy documents that have established the UN’s human security and 
vulnerability discourses. By applying this theory, I will invoke policy analysis on critical UN 
policies that have shaped the narrow way in which human security and vulnerability discourses 
have been constructed for women in conflict, namely, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 
1261 and 1265, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and UNSC Resolution 1325.  
Chapter 2 will establish background on the case study in which my analysis of 
representations of women in armed conflict zones will take place. The ongoing Syrian conflict 
will serve as the location for a single case-study analysis due to the conflict’s immense 
humanitarian crisis and a geo-political interest in the conflict from many international actors. A 
single-case study approach has both theoretical and methodological limitations, including that 
the method is not rigorous enough to produce more than descriptive results. Due to this 
limitation, generalizations in trends, behaviors, and ideas outside of the specific population or 
context cannot be drawn.2 Therefore, in this stage, I can only draw conclusions about how this 
discursive approach affects Syrian women refugees. However, an in-depth case study approach is 
                                                
2 Andrew Schrank, (2006) “Essentials for the Case Study Method,” in A Handbook for the Case 
Study Method, ed. Ellen Perecman and Sara Curran (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications), 171.  
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helpful for an initial policy analysis because the approach provides a strong foundation where 
budding and nascent consequences and implications can most clearly be illuminated.3  
Chapters 3 and 4 will fuse the the two foundations established in Chapters 1 and 2 to 
critically explore how UNSC Resolution 1325’s narrow human security and vulnerability 
discourse is applied to representations of Syrian women refugees. This examination will be done 
through discourse analysis of reports produced by UNHCR, UN Women, and IRC on the 
experiences of Syrian women refugees. A discourse analysis examines the processes and 
language mechanisms that create certain depictions, which ultimately lead to particular outcomes 
and implications. Its methodological aim is to search for the “causes of effects” of a particular 
condition.4 In this case, I am searching for the “causes” of continued hardship among Syrian 
women refugees. Chapter 3 will identify explicit representations of Syrian women refugees 
across the reports that arise from Resolution 1325, and analyze the representations for their 
consequences to what extent they contribute to suffering and continued vulnerability. In addition 
to communicate what is being explicitly articulated in the reports, a discourse analysis must also 
deconstruct what, or who, is silenced and absent. Chapter 4 will address misrepresentations and 
silences that UNSC Resolution 1325’s narrow discourse fails to address. Exposing these silences 
will prove to be critical in demonstrating why post-conflict suffering persists for Syrian women 
refugees, as well as the larger Syrian refugee population.  
Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude with a discussion on recommendations for moving forward 
carefully and dialogically with these discursive representations and their implications in mind. I 
                                                
3 Giovanni Sartori, (1991) “Comparing and Miscomparing” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(3): 
244.  
4 Donnatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, ed., (2008) Approaches and Methodologies in the 
Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 222. 
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will speak to forms of discourse development due to the way they are able to more equally and 
justly speak to a diverse range of lived experiences.  
I have three distinct objectives to in pursuing this thesis. I am motivated socially to challenge 
criticisms of the UN and its policies as inefficient, unproductive, and incompetent. Rather than 
simply accepting this classification, which simply discounts and discredits the policies and 
activity that come out of the UN and its agencies, the nexus in which policy rhetoric and 
implementation diverge must be critically searched for, identified, and named. That way, future 
policies can be fully implemented in a way that effectively addresses justice concerns for 
suffering and vulnerable populations. By searching for the source that obstructs policies and 
programs for healing, the ways in which violence and oppression can continue to exist 
systemically can be identified, despite international policies and rhetoric that call for human 
dignity, justice recognition, and social change. 
My second objective in writing this thesis is political. Syria has served as the stage for one of 
the most prominent international conflicts occurring in recent years, and likely for years to come, 
due to a resulting immense humanitarian crisis and diverse military involvement by international 
powers. While I do not expect the following analysis to miraculously solve the many crises that 
have evolved out of its civil war, I do hope for my writing to bring an alternative narrative to the 
Syrian conflict that exposes international responsibility with the current state of suffering. In 
apprehending the international community’s complicity with existing discourses, I hope to 
highlight how true reconciliation and more effective aid programs are being stalled.  
My final objective is moral. By exposing the narrowing tendencies of international policies 
and discourses on vulnerable communities, I hope to speak to patterns of structural silencing 
imposed on these communities. International policies and discourses construct boundaries 
 5 
around specifically defined victim communities.5 In doing so, the policies and discourses 
simultaneously overshadow, silence, and manipulate the lived experiences of those who fall 
outside of these constructed boundaries. Without naming and recognizing the imposition of these 
labels and boundaries, the international community is failing to sufficiently recognize brutal 
realities experienced universally, by human beings, as opposed to a specific victim class. This 
silencing is impeding full implementation of change that could more holistically address human 
suffering.  
  
                                                
5	  Jill Bennett, (2003) “Tenebrae After September 11: Art, Empathy, and the Global Politics of 
Belonging,” in World Memory: Personal Trajectories in Global Time, ed. Jill Bennett and 
Rosanne Kennedy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 178. 	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Chapter 1 
Development of Human Security and Vulnerability Discourses by the UN 
1.1 Overview of Discourse Development Theory 
Language is arguably one of the most powerful tools in world politics today. The words one 
chooses, the tone one takes, and the arena in which one speaks all constitute important decisions 
with often lasting political implications. Essentially, how one frames an issue matters greatly.6 
The process in which discussions on international political issues are constructed, framed, 
understood, and remembered can be explained as discourse. The way discourse within the UN 
context is produced and developed is a multi-layered process, with each layer having its own 
specific consequence.  
Discourse development can be explained through three main layers. In the first layer are 
initial discussions and debates of a topic. In these discussions, a specific language is created that 
informs how the topic comes to be understood and spoken about.7  Through these conversations, 
the established language becomes the primary way in which that topic is understood.8 However, 
as this language is presented as the primary mode that informs a public and widespread 
understanding of that topic, the language is streamlined to be presented in a simplified way. This 
trend happens in order to explain the topic to consuming publics in a palatable and commonly 
understood manner.9 In the second layer of discourse development, the simplified language from 
the first layer that informed nascent understandings of a topic is then used to inform, produce, 
                                                
6 Bob, Clifford, (2005) The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International 
Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 7.  
7 Natalie Florea Hudson. (2010) Gender, Human Security, and the United Nations (New York: 
Routledge), 2.  
8 Ibid, 18. 
9 Fionnuala N. Aoláin, (2011) “Women, Vulnerability, and Humanitarian Emergencies,” 
Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 18 (1): 5.  
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and justify policy in relation to the topic being discussed.10 The third layer of discourse 
construction is the application of its particular policy language as the primary framework to 
inform and construct representations of populations in individual conflict cases.11 As a process, 
discourse construction is a powerful concept that dictates a particular way in which an issue is 
discussed and understood through a streamlined and generalized language. This discourse 
development theory, and its multitude of consequences and implications, will be explained 
further as it is applied to trace how human security and vulnerability discourses for women in 
conflict zones have been established by the UN body. 
1.2 UN Discussion to Define Human Security 
In the UN context, the first layer of discourse development is represented by initial agency 
discussions that construct language and concepts around a particular political issue. For human 
security and vulnerability discourses, this was demonstrated through the organization’s evolving 
definition and conception of security.  
Classical approaches to security are traced back to the Westphalian system consolidated in 
Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, where major continental European states agreed to respect 
one another’s territorial integrity and gave the state ethical claims to its primacy in security.12 
This ideal continued through the 20th century, as state security focused on the effort to sustain 
and promote core values of sovereignty and territoriality in their relations with one another. The 
state came to be understood as a site that needed to be secured and placed the military as the 
                                                
10 Ruth Wodak, (2011) “Us and Them: Inclusion and Exclusion - Discrimination via Discourse,” 
in Identity, Belonging, and Migration. ed. Gerard Delanty, Ruth Wodak, and Paul Jones 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), 75. 
11 Sandra Whitworth. (2004) Men, Militarism, and Peacekeeping (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers), 28. 
12 Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, (2006) Human Security and the UN: A Critical 
History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 6. 
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institution that was best positioned to provide security against external threat. Thus, security 
became synonymous with military preparedness, as preservation of state independence and 
autonomy became paramount due to the onset of both World Wars.13 
However, the post-Cold War era initiated discussions that would alter the meaning of 
security. Following the Cold War, the nature of conflict shifted from threats of armed conflict 
between nation-states, to a higher prevalence of intra-state wars of aggression, colonial 
occupation, civil war, systemic human rights abuses, and terrorism. In this world system, the 
state’s credibility as the primary protector and provider of security began to be challenged.14 The 
UN recognized this shift and initiated discussions to alter security language that would reflect 
and encompass such a shift. In 1994, the UN Development Program (UNDP) released a Human 
Development Report that affirmed a need for a concept and language that would encompass the 
changing nature of security. The report states: 
The concept of security has of too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of 
territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests, or as global 
security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states 
than to people…Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives. For them, security can symbolize protection from the threat 
of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and 
environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding, one can now 
see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.15 
 
The report articulates a broader understanding of security, as well as the actors who may 
experience threats to security. UN discourse on security, at this point in time, ranges from 
individual and local concerns for food and economic security, to structural notions of security 
                                                
13 Ibid, 9. 
14 Ibid, 213. 
15 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, New York, 22. 
Available online: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf  
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coming from political or governmental sources. By noting the diverse sources that insecurity can 
come from, this report affirms discussions on security to shift toward a focus that would 
recognize the security of civilian’s lives.  
Out of this report came the term “human security,” as a novel concept and language to 
encompass this shift. Human security seeks to place the individual civilian as the principal 
referent of security, rather than a nation’s borders. The concept privileges the claims of civilians 
by advocating for greater consideration to their protections, rights, and welfare in order to 
establish a sustainable peace.16 This development of human security as a distinct concept and a 
language represents the first layer in how the UN has developed human security and 
vulnerability discourses. In context, the use of human security characterizes a distinct method of 
speaking about, understanding, and advocating for civilian protection in the face of 
multidimensional threats ranging from global to local.  
As the UN invoked and disseminated human security as a concept more and more, 
discussions around human security became increasingly streamlined as a leveraging point for 
more specific advocacy causes. From its initial construction that advocated for general civilian 
security from a wide range of threats, human security increasingly became utilized as the 
primary language from which to express a need to protect particular demographic groups in 
armed conflict zones. This trend is present in the first layer of theoretical discourse development 
where it is explained that when the first layer’s discussions enter and are repeatedly utilized in 
the public sphere, the concept begins to lose the multifaceted meanings behind it.17 As a 
consequence, critical concepts relating to the topics, lived experiences, and debates that human 
                                                
16 Lloyd Axworthy, (2001) “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First,” 
Global Governance 7 (1): 20. 
17 Aoláin, “Women, Vulnerability, and Humanitarian Emergencies,” 8.	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security originally represented are sidelined. As a result, the language meant to portray these 
intricacies and complexities of the lived experience are simplified. In the context of UN human 
security discourses, this pattern is demonstrated by the ways in which UNSC Resolutions 1261 
and 1265 limited human security language to equate and narrowly apply to the experiences of 
women and children in armed conflict zones. 
UNSC Resolution 1261 was adopted by the UN Security Council in 1999 and expressed 
concern for physical and human security of children during and after armed conflict. The 
Resolution recognizes the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children and 
strongly condemns the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict.18 Sections of the 
Resolution speak specifically to the particular needs of the girl child that arise throughout and 
after armed conflict. The Resolution demonstrates a narrowing of original UN human security 
discourses because it narrows the scope of civilian protection to one that solely recognizes a need 
to maintain security for children, and expresses the female experience as particularly worthy of 
attention. By making note of the female experience in relation to discussions on human security, 
the UN is effectively limiting human security language from a discourse that originally focused 
on the broad “citizen” to a discourse that is focused to particular cohorts. In doing so, the 
Resolution simplifies the original issue of all citizen security that comes under threat in conflict, 
to one that affects just certain populations, namely the child and female child subject.  
UNSC Resolution 1265 engages in a similar process of simplifying original UN human 
security discourses into a narrative that encompasses insecurity and vulnerability experienced by 
a specific group of civilians. Also adopted in 1999, Resolution 1265 expresses concern for the 
increasingly high numbers of civilian casualties, presence of civilian targeting, and significant 
                                                
18 UN Security Council Resolution 1261 (1999), Children and Armed Conflict, S/Res/1261: 1. 
Available online: https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1261 
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hardships borne by civilians during armed conflict. Rather than maintaining an approach 
throughout its text to encompass the, presumed, multitude of civilians who may be experiencing 
hardships due to armed conflict, the text of the Resolution instead expresses grave concern 
narrowly to, “women, children, and other vulnerable groups.”19 The Resolution states that armed 
conflict has a direct and particular impact on women and calls for operations that provide special 
protection and assistance provision for women, as a group that requires particular attention.20 
Through this Resolution, it is seen how language informing human security discussions has 
become increasingly narrowed to specific subjects and locations of vulnerability in the UN 
context. The two preceding Resolutions have narrowed human security language into a rhetorical 
framework that focuses on the experiences, needs, and vulnerabilities of a particular 
demographic group, namely women and girls, who are experiencing threats to their security from 
a particular source, namely armed conflict.  
Initial UN discussions that first invoked human security constructed the concept within a 
broad framework that did not establish boundaries around who specifically constituted as a 
vulnerable citizen and to what external force created their insecurity. However, as discourses on 
human security and vulnerability have developed within the UN, the organization has adopted 
language that has narrowed the framework of human security into one that is focused on 
protecting women in armed conflict zones. This pattern represents the first layer of human 
security discourse development on women in conflict zones by the UN. In this layer, human 
security has been manipulated into a simplified term that narrowly recognizes the security and 
                                                
19 UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999). The Protections of Civilians in Armed Conflict. 
S/Res/1265: 2. Available online: https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1265 
20 Ibid, 1. 
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suffering of women in conflict zones, rather than addressing the potential vulnerability of 
civilians as a whole that may arise inside or outside of armed conflict areas.  
A broader implication that arises from manipulating and limiting the rhetorical scope of 
human security discourses that speak to the experiences of vulnerable populations is that such a 
narrow discursive scope limits the possible narratives of vulnerability that are recognized and 
made visible by the UN. This layer initiates discussions that escalate into powerful tools that can 
rewrite, silence, and discredit experiences and arguments that are dissonant to its narrowly 
constructed framework. Consequently, when narratives or experiences of an individual fall 
outside of the UN’s narrowly defined boundary of vulnerability, in this case it is women in 
armed conflict zones, they are largely discredited.21 By constructing this boundary around 
vulnerability, discourse actively includes certain groups by legitimating and voicing their 
experiences, while excluding others. Therefore, the opinion, narrative, or experience of an 
individual that diverges from this dominant discourse subsequently finds his voice, dignity, and 
integrity discredited, minimized, and silenced. 
1.3 UN Development of Policies on Gendered Vulnerability 
Referring back to the broad abstraction of discourse development theory introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter, the second layer of development is described as when the narrowed 
language and simplified contexts that were constructed to understand and inform the particular 
topic are explicitly applied and established as policy. In terms of UN human security and 
vulnerability discourses on women in conflict zones, this second layer is reflected through the 
adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and UN Resolution 1325. These 
policies draw on the previously explained particular understanding of human security and 
                                                
21 Wodak, “Us and Them,” 56.  
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vulnerability as applicable to advocate for protection of specific demographic groups through 
related policies. 
The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing strengthened the discursive construction 
of human security as a concept limited to speaking about the experiences of vulnerability felt by 
women in armed conflict zones through a Declaration and a Platform for Action. The Beijing 
Declaration, similar to the aforementioned UNSC Resolutions, narrows the conception of human 
security in armed conflict by speaking about conflicts’ specific consequences in terms of its 
particular effects on women. The Declaration states, “While entire communities suffer the 
consequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected because 
of their status in society and their sex...The impact of violence against women and violation of 
the human rights of women in such situations [armed conflict situations] is experienced by 
women who suffer displacement, loss of home and property, loss or disappearance of close 
relatives, poverty, and family separation and disintegration, and who are victims of acts of 
murder, terrorism, torture, involuntary disappearance, sexual slavery, rape, sexual abuse, and 
forced pregnancy.”22 The Declaration invokes UN human security discourses by discussing the 
effects of armed conflict in terms of various human rights abuses and traumatic acts inflicted on 
civilians that would harm the civilian’s internal primary of security and dignity. However, the 
Declaration invokes a narrow framing toward the population of civilians exposed to such 
insecurity.  
Then, this narrowed form of human security and vulnerability discourses is applied and 
established into concrete policy through the Beijing Platform for Action. The Platform is a policy 
agenda for women’s empowerment that targets a number of strategic objectives and proposes 
                                                
22 Beijing Declaration (1995), Beijing, 15 September 1995: 57. Available online: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/official.htm  
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concrete actions to work toward these objectives. There is a specific section within the Platform 
that recognizes and proposes strategies to address vulnerabilities experienced by women in 
armed conflict zones. The chapter states, “Women and girls are particularly affected [by armed 
conflict] because of their status in society and their sex…During times of armed conflict and the 
collapse of communities, consideration for the livelihoods of women is crucial.”23 Then, 
informed by a narrow rhetoric that recognizes human security as women’s vulnerabilities in 
conflict zones, the Platform calls for governments, NGOs, and other relevant institutions to 
provide protection, assistance, and training specifically to displaced women in need of 
international protection post-conflict. Specifically, the Platform calls upon these actors to take 
steps to find durable solutions to women’s displacement, protect the safety and integrity of 
women during displacement, and provide women who have been determined refugees with 
access to professional training programs, language training, small-scale enterprise development, 
and counseling.24 The Platform for Action utilizes the UN’s language relating to the concept of 
human security because it narrowly addresses the particular effects and vulnerabilities 
experienced by women in conflict zones. It takes this rhetoric further, though, by using that 
language as a source of inspiration to justify policy and responsive action among international 
actors.  
The second layer of discourse development in the context of human security and 
vulnerability discourses in the UN context is also manifested as policy through UNSC 
Resolution 1325. Unanimously adopted in 2000, Resolution 1325 speaks to the particular 
vulnerabilities experienced by women who have been affected by violent and armed conflict, and 
                                                
23 Beijing Platform for Action (1995), Beijing, 15 September 1995: 56. Available online: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/official.htm 
24 Ibid, 63.	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advocates for increased awareness and aid on their behalf. The language of the Resolution 
utilizes the same conceptual understanding of human security and vulnerability that was noted 
previously, by narrowly presenting insecurity as the vulnerability experienced by women in 
armed conflict zones. The document utilizes rhetoric that places women as the “vast majority of 
those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced 
persons.”25  
Informed by limited conceptual developments on human security and vulnerability, the 
Resolution, as a policy, works to establish concrete procedures that focus on protecting women 
in conflict settings and encourages their participation in conflict resolution activities. The 
Resolution utilizes this framework to inform practices, goals, and benchmarks laid out in the 
policy. The Resolution outlines 18 acts that identify ways governments, the UN, and NGOs can 
address the needs of women and girls that arise in armed conflict. Some of these policies include 
recognizing the specific needs of women during resettlement, rehabilitation, and post-conflict 
reconstruction, protecting women from all forms of violence in settings of armed conflict and 
post-conflict, and taking into account the needs of women in humanitarian programs and refugee 
settlements.26 By establishing these policy goals and practices solely in terms of women in armed 
conflict zones, the Resolution demonstrates how the UN has applied its narrow discursive 
development of human security and vulnerability that expresses human security concerns in 
terms of women’s vulnerability to inform related policy. The adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 
illustrates how the UN has established binding policies and formulated concrete calls for action 
for a particular population based off of narrow and limiting discourse. UNSC Resolution 1325 is 
                                                
25 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), Women, Peace and Security, S/Res/1325: 1. 
Available online: http://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1325  
26 Ibid, 3. 
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built on specific discourses on human security and vulnerability that are concerned with how 
these concepts apply to women, and therefore, its substantive calls for change are only applicable 
within such a narrowed and limited context.   
The broader implication that arises within this layer is significant, as it sheds light on power 
dynamics in international politics. As the central governing node of international political 
structures, UN policies, documents, and statements come to hold a distinct power. With this 
understanding, the UN has the power to disseminate its discourses in a way that construct, 
define, and portray certain identities and groups to larger international audiences.27 In doing so, 
the UN disseminates information and narratives to wider publics that inform beliefs, opinions, 
and ideologies. This dissemination is dangerous, though, because the UN Resolution 1325’s 
specific policy discourse on human security and vulnerability have been developed from narrow 
and simplified contexts, as seen across the first two layers of discourse development. Therefore, 
these simplified contexts and narrow policy discourse is what becomes disseminated as 
unquestionably accurate information to consuming publics. In the process of disseminating 
limited understandings on the experiences of vulnerable populations to wider audiences, the UN 
is subsequently speaking on behalf of disadvantaged populations and rendering them voiceless.28 
In practice, this multilayered and complex development of discourse falsely interprets, 
generalizes, and simplifies the authentic lived experiences of these populations by clouding their 
voices under a dangerous assumption that they are already being spoken for.  
Moreover, the construction of UNSC Resolution 1325, a policy that utilizes the 
organization’s own limited human security and vulnerability discourses, further entrenches a 
limited perspective that is capable of recognizing comprehensive contexts of suffering. However, 
                                                
27 Whitworth, Men, Militarism, 27. 
28 Ibid, 29. 
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I argue that this is why the international community continues to see the UN’s language and 
rhetoric of solidarity dedicated to alleviating human suffering, but only sees its partial 
implementation which, ultimately, leaves a significant amount of suffering in place and 
unacknowledged without the appropriate means to redress it. UNSC Resolution 1325 policy 
discourse is informed by simplified contexts and perspectives that do not broadly recognize the 
full, lived experience of human suffering. Rather, UNSC Resolution 1325 policy discourse 
focuses narrowly on particular, constructed experiences of suffering, leading the Resolution to be 
unequipped in truly making a difference that would effectively change the existing structure of 
suffering.  
1.4 Application of Gendered Vulnerability to Inform Representations of Women in Conflict 
Zones 
In the third layer of discourse development, the policy and its language that has been 
established in the previous two layers, is applied as a general framework to explain and describe 
individual cases of human suffering in reporting done on a conflict. In doing so, the experiences, 
narratives, and needs of women within the examined conflict’s context are altered into 
representations that align with Resolution 1325 and the policy’s discourse. In practice, this third 
layer is reflected in reporting done by UN agencies and international NGOs on specific 
international conflicts. Within these reports, the experiences and narratives of those living in or 
affected by the conflict are discussed through representations that fit within the framework of 
human security and vulnerability discourse as utilized in UNSC Resolution 1325. As such, the 
scope in which the particular conflict and its devastating effects are reported on, are framed 
narrowly to speak to the hardships experienced by women. 
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The broader implication in this level of discourse development is that the policy and its 
discursive scope is used in practice to inform programs and aid meant to alleviate suffering. 
However, they do so within a limited context of security and vulnerability. Therefore, I argue 
that these narrow representations, informed by UNSC Resolution 1325, allow suffering for 
women to continue because they manipulate experiences of women to fit within prescribed 
frameworks that simplify their scope of suffering. When applying this process in the context of a 
specific conflict case, there are several important consequences and implications for those who 
find themselves both within and silenced by the Resolution’s discourse. In order to examine this 
process more thoroughly, a specific international conflict will be chosen as the location for study. 
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Chapter 2 
Location of the Representations 
In order to demonstrate the third layer of discourse development that applies and imposes 
the established human security and vulnerability rhetoric, language, and policies into 
representations of women within individual cases of conflict zones, it is necessary to locate a 
conflict for analysis. What began as a populist uprising in 2011 against a longstanding military 
regime, Syria has since transformed into a complicated civil war that has affected millions of 
lives through violent conflict, displacement, and political instability. The context of the current 
civil war will be explained through humanitarian and geo-political lenses. However, a brief 
overview of the state’s historical narrative is needed first in order to position the conflict’s 
current state with respect to the country’s own political history and its role in international 
history. 
2.1 Political History of Syria 
Following World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the modern Syrian state 
was established under a French mandate in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The 
Agreement between the United Kingdom, France, and the Russian Empire, should their alliance 
succeed in defeating the Ottoman Empire in World War I defined their proposed spheres of 
influence and control in Southwestern Asia.29 The agreement shaped the region by defining the 
borders of Syria, Iraq, and a number of other states on Western terms. Syria came under control 
of the French, who carried out administration of the region. The state gained independence as a 
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parliamentary republic on 24 October 1945 when Syria joined the United Nations, an act that 
legally ended the French occupation.30 
The post-independence period was tumultuous with a large number of military coups that 
shook the country from 1949-1970. In 1958, Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli and Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced a merging of Egypt and Syria to create the United 
Arab Republic (UAR) in an attempt to solidify Pan-Arab nationalism in the region.31 Under this 
union, all Syrian political parties were required to dissolve all action, including Syrian nationalist 
groups and minorities who had been actively demanding socialist reforms. Western powers 
supported, and even diplomatically encouraged, this unification due to a series of institutional 
changes in the Syrian government that generated suspicion of a communist takeover in Syria.32 
For example, Syrian President al-Quwatli appointed a new chief-of-staff in the Syrian Army who 
alleged to be a Soviet sympathizer by Western governments.33 His appointment increased tension 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, who were already at odds on geopolitical, 
ideological, and economical terms. However, a Syrian union with Egypt that called for cessation 
of all Syrian political parties, including the communists therein, quelled Western worry.  
International pressure led to a quick merger between the two states, which gave Nasser the 
opportunity to impose decisive and non-negotiable terms. In addition to the dissolution of all 
public political life in Syria, Nasser established a new provisional constitution that proclaimed a 
600-member National Assembly composed of 400 members from Egypt and 200 from Syria.34 
While this structure made room for some former Syrian Ba’ath Party members to hold prominent 
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political positions, they never reached positions as high in the government as the Egyptian 
officials. The Syrian Ba’ath Party also favored Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism ideologies, 
but resented being subordinate to Egyptian officers and Nasser. Worried and alarmed by the 
Syrian Ba’athist party’s poor position, a group of Syrian Ba’athist officers decided to form a 
secret Military Committee. Its initial members included Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid, and 
Hafez al-Assad.35 
In 1961, this disgruntled Military Committee organized a coup that resulted in the break-up 
of the UAR and the restoration of an independent Syrian Republic.36 While the country became 
independent from Egypt, the resulting state was fragile and chaotic as many internal political 
parties struggled to influence government policy.  In 1963, the Syrian Ba’ath Party successfully 
organized a coup and seized power. However, in 1966, the Military Committee carried out an 
intra-party overthrow and established Salah Jadid as ruler from 1966 to 1970 with Hafez al-
Assad (herein referred to as Hafez) his defense minister.37  
1970 marked an important year for this new regime. In September, conflict erupted in Jordan 
between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy. In 
response, Jadid sent Syrian troops to aid the PLO efforts, but this action was not supported by 
Hafez, and he ordered the troops to withdraw.38 Hafez did not support aiding the PLO at this 
time because Israel threatened military intervention if the Syrians did aid the PLO. Hafez wanted 
to avoid conflict with Israelis because he did not want take any actions that would rupture the 
general fragility of their new regime. However, Israel made these threats at the behest of the U.S. 
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under President Nixon and then-National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger.39 These threats, 
though, were convincing enough to stop Hafez from entering battle, resulting in a dispute 
between Jadid and Hafez with momentous consequences. This discrepancy in action ignited 
conflict between their respective wings of the Ba’ath Party, and, in November, Hafez launched 
an intra-party coup against Jadid. Hafez succeeded in taking power, where he would remain until 
his death in 2000.40  
Domestically, Hafez instituted one-man rule and organized state services along sectarian 
lines while he was in power. The Sunni population were established as the formal heads of 
political institutions while the Alawites, Hafez’s Islamic sect, were given control over the 
military, intelligence, and security apparatuses.41 The formerly shared powers of Ba’athist 
decision-making were curtailed, and transferred to solely to the presidency. The government 
ceased to be a one-party, Ba’athist system, and was turned into a one-party state with a strong 
presidency. Internationally, Hafez worked to strengthen the country’s foreign relations. When 
Hafez assumed power, he sought allies, thereby prompting a visit to the Soviet Union.42 Hafez 
sought to make Syria the defender of Arab interest against Israel, and believed the Soviet Union 
would be a powerful ally in this mission. While the Soviet relationship with the Syrian 
government would never be as deep as the United States’ relationship with Israel, the 
relationship prospered nonetheless. Assad was willing to give the Soviets a stable presence in the 
Middle East through Syria, access to Syrian naval bases, and help in curtailing American 
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influence in the region.43 This positive ally ship continued through the Cold War where Hafez 
sided with the Soviet Union, who promised support against Israel in return.44 These close ties 
between the Syrian and, now, Russian governments continue as an important aspect of the 
present conflict. 
The purpose of this history of Syria has been to demonstrate how the state has had historical 
experience with socio-political uneasiness, and how the state has historically been a location of 
interest within international relations and among international powers, such as the United States 
and the Soviet Union/Russia. These international ties become especially significant when Syria 
spiraled into civil war in 2011.  
2.2 Syrian Conflict: Geo-Political Context (2011-present) 
When Hafez died in 2000, he was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad (herein referred to 
Bashar), who structured his regime along similar power lines to his father. His regime continued 
to exploit ethnic and sectarian divisions in the country to retain strong political power. He also 
maintained his party’s power through potentially manipulated elections. In both the 2000 and 
2007 Syrian presidential elections, other candidates were not permitted to run against him and 
Bashar received votes in the upper 90th percentile in uncontested elections.45   
Civil unrest in Syria began in the early spring of 2011 within the context of the Arab Spring 
protests, a wave of both violent and nonviolent demonstrations, protests, and riots across the 
wider Arab World. Nationwide protests rallied against Bashar’s government, whose forces 
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responded with violent crackdowns.46 The conflict gradually morphed from mass protests to an 
armed rebellion after months of military sieges. Fighting reached the country’s capital Damascus 
and second major city Aleppo in 2012, and by July 2013, the UN estimated that 90,000 
combatants and non-combatants had been killed in the conflict.47  
What began as another Arab Spring uprising against an autocratic ruler has since spiraled 
into a brutal proxy war that has drawn in regional and world powers. From the early stages, 
Bashar’s Shi’a Alawite sect government received technical, financial, military, and political 
support from Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Shi’a Hezbollah groups.48 Support from Russia has been 
most prominent, and is not surprising considering the two countries’ longstanding historical 
relationship from when Hafez held power. Russia has provided weapons to the Syrian 
government, launched air strikes against Bashar’s opponents and, as a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council, has repeatedly vetoed draft resolutions that would have left open the 
possibility of UN sanctions or military intervention against Bashar’s government.49 Meanwhile, 
the Sunni-dominated opposition has attracted support from international backers such as the 
United States, Turkey, and Jordan. This coalition is primarily U.S.-led, with funding for arms 
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provision and military training to rebel groups coming from the U.S. and being carried out on the 
Turkish-Syrian border, as well as in Jordan.50  
While the number of international actors involved and each one’s level of involvement in the 
Syrian civil war is difficult to parse, majority of the international involvement has been 
organized by Russia and the U.S. Leaders from the two countries have blamed the other in 
allowing the conflict to persist. U.S. President Barack Obama has accused Russia as the outlier in 
a, “global coalition organized against the Assad Regime,” and that Russia’s failure to cooperate 
in this coalition has hindered a resolution for the civil war in Syria.51 The resulting proxy-war 
between the U.S. and Russia has led commentators to characterize the situation in Syria as a 
“proto-world war with nearly a dozen countries embroiled in overlapping conflicts.”52 With such 
undisputed permission for Syria to serve as geographic battleground of intense discord between 
two major international power players, the resulting effects of the original 2011 uprisings have 
spiraled into chaos, displacement, and insecurity for the people of Syria.  
2.3 Syrian Conflict: Humanitarian Context (2011-present) 
As the conflict has continued and transformed from a civil uprising to a full-fledged civil war 
with heavy international intervention, the conflict’s effects on the Syrian population, as well as 
populations in surrounding countries, have become increasingly detrimental. A number of 
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political leaders, international organizations, and media outlets have named the Syrian conflict as 
the most significant humanitarian crisis since World War II.53 Estimates of death, both combat 
deaths and civilian deaths, vary widely with figures ranging from 250,000 to 470,000. Further, 
the violence has caused millions to flee their homes, with an estimated 45% of the Syrian 
population displaced.54 
For those inside of the country, the UN estimated there were 6.8 million Syrians in need of 
humanitarian assistance in 2013, with 4.25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2013 
within the country.55 An emergency to this extent led the UN to estimate that 4 million Syrians 
were in need of food assistance that year. In the past three years, though, these estimates have 
skyrocketed. As of March 2016, the UN estimates that there are 13.5 million Syrians in need of 
humanitarian assistance, with 6.5 million IDPs.56 While there have been many efforts by the UN, 
international NGOs, and direct funding from other states to provide humanitarian assistance 
internally, many obstacles to delivery have arisen due to restricted access, attacks on 
humanitarian workers, and lack of response coordination between agencies. 
While the conflict has had immense effects on civilians who have remained in the country, 
much attention has been paid to the Syrian population have been made refugees and have been 
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forced to flee their homes for another country. In 2014, the UN estimated around 2.5 million 
Syrians had fled the country. As of March 2016, this figure has nearly doubled to 4.8 million. 
With such high numbers of individuals estimated to be in need of assistance, the UN has 
requested $3.18 billion of aid funding in order to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance and 
protection to the Syrian refugee population.57 Majority of Syrian refugees have fled to 
neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. A discourse analysis on 
the reporting of experiences and adoption of aid programs that UN agencies and the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC), a global humanitarian aid and development NGO that provides 
immediate aid and development assistance to refugees and those displaced by war, persecution, 
or natural disaster, have enacted for this specific subset of those affected by the Syrian conflict 
form the basis for the following two chapters.  
Although this section largely commodified the impact and suffering caused by the Syrian 
conflict through numbers and statistics, its purpose was not only to demonstrate the immense 
repercussions that have arisen out of this conflict. Its purpose was also to demonstrate that 
despite the high level of visibility and attention received by this conflict and attempts to provide 
humanitarian aid by a variety of organizations, these numbers have continued to rise.  
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Chapter 3 
Discursively Informed Representations of Syrian women refugees 
 The central puzzle that focuses this thesis is that there are discussions and policies at the 
UN level, whose development was traced in the first chapter, that recognize the hardship and 
trauma experienced by women in armed conflict zones. However, suffering amongst women in 
conflict zones continues. This chapter will focus on how the narrow scope of UNSC Resolution 
1325 and its discourse on human security and vulnerability have encouraged similarly narrow 
representations of Syrian women refugees through reporting done by the UNHCR, UN Women, 
and the IRC. This chapter will name three of these tropes about Syrian women refugees and 
analyze how the tropes manifest from UNSC Resolution 1325 discourse to inform subsequent 
humanitarian intervention and aid programs. Finally, the programs and responses will be 
evaluated in terms of the potential level to which they address persistent suffering or continue to 
leave a significant amount of suffering experienced by Syrian women refugees in place and 
insufficiently acknowledged. 
3.1 Suffering Yet Empowered Paradigm 
One of the representations that USC Resolution 1325 discourse invokes about women in 
armed conflict zones is a trope that women are negatively affected by armed conflict in a 
multitude of traumatizing ways, but emerge as resilient and critical peacebuilding tools post-
conflict. The Resolution speaks to the number of traumatic experiences faced by women in 
armed conflict, including gender-based and sexual violence, targeting from armed combatants 
due to their sex, and increased likelihood of women to become refugees or internally displaced 
persons (IDPs).58 Yet, despite all of these debilitating circumstances, the Resolution pinpoints 
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women as necessary peacebuilding resources. In its text, the Resolution affirms women as 
having an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building and 
calls for, “effective institutional arrangements to guarantee [women’s] protection and full 
participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion 
of international peace and security.”59 As such, the Resolution calls for women’s empowerment, 
recognition, and participation to be critically necessary in post-conflict reconstruction activities. 
This suffering yet empowered paradigm encouraged by Resolution 1325 feeds into reporting 
done on the livelihoods of Syrian female refugees. 
A duality of vulnerable yet resilient women in armed conflict emerges in UN agencies and 
the IRC publications on Syrian women refugees. Largely, these women are portrayed as isolated, 
anxious, and alone. Yet, in spite of this hardship, the women remain strong, resilient, and 
committed to building a better future for themselves and their families. Throughout the UNHCR 
and IRC sources, this trope is evident. The UNHCR report, “Woman Alone: The Fight for 
Survival by Syria’s Refugee Women,” describes how women are isolated and left without a 
network of support due to the ways in which war and fleeing from war has broken apart their 
families and communities. The report states the women are left to navigate their new 
environment without a typical support network of friends and family that used to surround 
them.60 However, in the face of such adversity, the report states that some women still strive to 
find support from other refugees in their new communities that provide solidarity, material 
support, and an avenue to share information.61 The IRC publication, “Are We Listening? Acting 
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on Our Commitments to Women and Girls Affected by the Syrian Conflict,” also depicts this 
image by describing Syrian women refugees as “isolated and imprisoned” within their own 
homes. In a survey, the report found that half of the female refugees interviewed in Jordan, 
Lebanon, or Egypt left their residence in their host community less than when they were living in 
Syria, which is main a factor contributing to feelings of isolation. The language in the report 
positions majority of these women as “too scared and overwhelmed” to leave their residences.62 
Despite this image of isolation, however, the report reaffirms Syrian women’s strength by stating 
that they, “demonstrate resilience and courage every day, yet the risks they face continue to 
worsen.”63 Mirroring UNSC Resolution 1325’s discursive construction of women in armed 
conflict zones is a representation of Syrian women refugees as similarly isolated yet resilient. 
This representation has subsequent implications that directly affect the lives of Syrian women 
refugees because, in this third level of discourse development, UNSC Resolution 1325 discourse 
and the representations that the Resolution informs are used to form the basis for subsequent aid 
programs that are supported and carried out by UN agencies and the IRC. Programs that respond 
to feelings of isolation felt by refugee women emphasize building community-based support in 
spaces where they can simultaneously express their hardships and promote their communal 
resilience with other refugee women. The UNHCR has partnered with local organizations in 
neighboring countries to start or sustain women’s centers and vocational schools where women 
can come together in a safe space to socialize, talk through shared experiences, and provide 
support for one another.64 These centers are portrayed as spaces where women can obtain access 
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to economic opportunities or job training programs while also engaging with other women. A 
center in Lebanon started a knitting group for women to overcome their sense of isolation and 
gather together in a support group-like setting.65 A center in Jordan provides cash for work 
programs where women work in tailoring, clothing production, or hairdressing to receive 
economic assistance and work as part of a group to build community.66 The IRC has opened and 
funded similar centers that provide community-based education for women ranging from safety 
training, to counseling needs, to guided group discussions. These centers aim to provide 
emotional, community-based support in a safe, confidential space for women refugees. The 
programs and opportunities these centers provide are framed as an opportunity for Syrian women 
refugees to break the chain of isolation, build confidence, and establish a network in which these 
women can turn to one another for support and advice.   
A discursive representation of Syrian women refugees as resilient yet empowered appears to 
be both effective and limiting at addressing continued suffering experienced by these women. 
Building a trusting and supportive community is an effective response generated out of a 
framework that largely portrays refugee women as alone, isolated, and overwhelmed. In these 
spaces, women are encouraged and have the internal efficacy to seek collective support, regain 
emotional and psychological strength, and access the tools they need to participate actively in 
their new life and plan for the future. This representation, at the same time, however, can be 
limiting for Syrian women refugees who have experienced trauma because it provides just one 
predetermined method of coping. A representation of Syrian women refugees as both suffering 
and asserting resilience encourages aid programs designed for women to quickly adjust and 
rejoin society. However, such a representation simplifies the path of dealing with and 
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overcoming trauma. Then, subsequent aid responses, that are informed by this simplified 
representation, do not make room for alternative modes of healing. After witnessing and living 
devastating effects of a civil war, an ideal and monolithic path to empowerment through 
community cannot be as simply or universally applied as the publications and UNSC Resolution 
1325’s discourse make it out to be. Therefore, a representation of women as vulnerable yet 
resilient does contribute, partially at least, to persistent suffering of Syrian women refugees 
because it fails to approach the healing process of trauma in a multifaceted and comprehensive 
way.  
3.2 Pervasive Prevalence of Sexual Violence 
The second representation of women in armed conflict that is inspired by UNSC Resolution 
1325 human security and vulnerability discourse raises awareness on women’s increased 
vulnerability to gender-based violence, particularly sexual assault and harassment. As a part of 
this representation, women in armed conflict zones are portrayed as victims to a devastating form 
of violence that is constantly present, and that they cannot control of combat. An ability to raise 
awareness about sexual violence and harassment, a globally taboo and stigmatized subject, is 
permitted and established in UNSC Resolution 1325. The Resolution calls on all parties in armed 
conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, 
particularly from rape and other forms of sexual abuse. It also emphasizes a responsibility for all 
states to put an end to impunity of this violence and to prosecute those responsible for crimes 
relating to sexual violence against women.67 Not only does the rhetoric of the Resolution 
promote awareness toward instances of sexual violence in post-conflict environments, it also 
calls for the perpetrator to be  publically named and punished appropriately. Policy permission to 
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address sexual crimes in such an open manner feeds into how UN agencies and the IRC address 
instances of sexual violence in their reporting on the experiences of Syrian women refugees.  
The three reports examined engage in a careful discussion of sexual and gender-based 
violence as omnipresent for Syrian women refugees, and the UN Woman source, “We Just Keep 
Silent: Gender-Based Violence Amongst Syrian Refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” was 
solely dedicated to this topic. The UNHCR report uses language that openly describes sexual 
violence as a pervasive threat for Syrian women refugees because it can be threatened from a 
multitude of sources, such as from male refugees, males from the host community, or from 
service providers. As such, women are left to, “live in constant and paralyzing fear.”68 The UN 
Women report depicts similar scenes of persistent sexual harassment faced by Syrian women 
refugees. The report describes how female refugees are often approached in public places by 
local men who make unwanted comments, propose inappropriate relationships, or demand sexual 
favors. Experiences of harassment, such as these, are attributed to perceptions that these women 
refugees are either unwanted or resented in this new environment, or that they are seen as “cheap 
and vulnerable” and therefore are easily targeted.69  
The IRC report reinforces similar discourse about fear and vulnerability toward occurrences 
of sexual harassment and violence. In its reporting, the IRC identified these vulnerabilities as 
pervasive due to the ways they occur both outside and inside the woman’s residing space. The 
report covers the similar issue of harassment in public places that the UN agency reports do, but 
also discusses their physical place of residence as a space where domestic violence can occur. 
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The report depicts their living space not as a place of refuge from the stresses of the outside 
environment, but a place in which women can become victim to intimate partner violence and 
domestic abuse. According to the IRC, increased physical and emotional violence from husbands 
who have fled Syria is rationalized as men’s way of coping with the stress of a new environment, 
the psychological trauma of war, and economic or employment frustration.70 The implications of 
a framing where the livelihoods of Syrian women refugees are consistently threated by potential 
instances of sexual violence can be evaluated by how UN agencies and the IRC utilize this 
framework to inform their aid programs for sexual violence survivors.  
Aid programs informed by UNSC Resolution 1325 discourse that are meant to raise 
awareness and visibility to devastating threat of sexual harassment and violence faced by refugee 
women implement a holistic approaches meant to emotionally, psychologically, medically, 
legally, and economically assist female victims. The UNHCR report highlights a need for safe 
spaces to create a sense of community and trust among Syrian women refugees, and discusses 
how the women’s centers they have created and supported encourage guided discussions and 
psychosocial assistance to deal with the aftermath of trauma.71 These spaces hope to build a 
sense of trust and internal strength for women to speak out and support one another, despite the 
possible stigma associated with experiencing sexual violence. The UN Women report has 
implemented programs for sexual violence survivors that include education and job training to 
build potential economic viability for women in work as tailors, cooks, or hairdressers. That way, 
the hope is for Syrian women refugees to not feel a need to rely on extreme measures to obtain 
money, food, and other resources.72 The IRC also highlights a desire to provide safety to Syrian 
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women refugees from gender-based violence by providing safety and counseling services in 
appropriate learning and community-centered spaces. In these spaces, the IRC aims to provide 
appropriate and timely medical, emotional, and psychological care for survivors. The IRC also 
advocates for an important legal change for refugees in foreign countries. Some host countries 
that house many Syrian refugees, such as Lebanon, do not allow women to register individually 
without a male companion, thus limiting her ability to access local services and resources. 
However, if this requirement were to be abolished, and thereby provide women access to 
individual registration, the female refugees would be able to operate independently and gain 
access to important services without needing outside consent or companionship. That way, 
female refugees experiencing domestic violence would no longer feel bound to their potential 
aggressor.73 
A discursive representation of Syrian women as consistently vulnerable to pervasive threats 
of sexual violence appears to, again, be both effective and limiting in contributing to continued 
suffering experienced by Syrian women refugees. The responses and programs informed by this 
framing appear to be providing necessary support for Syrian female refugees who have been 
victim to these sources of violence. The support appears to be effective because it recognizes 
multifaceted aspects of recovery for victims of trauma, including psychological assistance, 
medical care, and economic support programs. By representing vulnerability to sexual violence 
as a particular insecurity for women that can come from a number of actors and arise in a number 
of spaces, UN agencies and the IRC have been led to establish spaces in which Syrian women 
refugees can seek safe and holistic sources of assistance. However, a representation of sexual 
violence as an omnipresent threat to violence simultaneously permits widespread suffering of 
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Syrian women refugees to continue. By perceiving sexual violence as a type of insecurity whose 
presence cannot be combated by women due to its pervasiveness, sexual violence becomes 
constructed as a norm for women in conflict zones. Therefore, discussions on how to combat the 
structural conditions that allow a norm of sexual violence to persist are left out in policy 
discourse and aid programs meant to alleviate suffering. These conditions could arise from legal, 
social, and political forces including domestic violence law, safety of refugee populated 
neighborhoods, or social attitudes held about the female Syrian refugee population. However, 
Resolution 1325 encourages representations of sexual violence that are only critical of its 
existence. By failing to fully acknowledge the context in which sexual violence exists, 
particularly with regard to the structural sources that can contribute to the existence of sexual 
violence, widespread suffering of Syrian women refugees will persist in spite of policy discourse 
meant to alleviate it.  
3.3 Hierarchy of Vulnerability 
A framing that classifies female Syrian refugees as the “most vulnerable” among the general 
refugee population is also justified and informed by politically legitimized human security and 
vulnerability discourse. UNSC Resolution 1325 iterated this distinctly heightened burden for 
women by expressing concern that women and children account for the vast majority of those 
adversely affected by armed conflict. Additionally, the adoption of this Resolution in general by 
the UN further solidifies women’s categorization of vulnerability at the highest level. The sheer 
creation and adoption of a policy to recognize women in armed conflict zones as a distinctly 
vulnerable demographic group provides political legitimacy to the construction of an imagined 
hierarchy of vulnerability in which these women are placed at the top. Therefore, the discourse 
of vulnerability found in UNSC Resolution 1325 have informed a framework that allows UN 
 37 
agency and IRC reports to position refugees within a hierarchy that discusses refugee women as 
the most vulnerable.  
The UNHCR organizes its dispersal of resettlement aid based on who the report titles the 
“most vulnerable refugees.” In Jordan, 40% of UNHCR financial assistance goes to households 
that are classified as the “most vulnerable.”74 UN Women makes similar distinctions by 
recognizing that life is tough for refugees, but women and girls in particular are severely and 
adversely affected by the effects of conflict. The report states women and girls are more reticent 
to admit problems, leaving them to, “suffer silently in suffocating tents and experience the worst 
kinds of exploitation.”75 The IRC paints a similar picture of female Syrian refugees as the 
distinct group who experiences the most burden from fleeing conflict. As refugees, the report 
states, Syrian women have fled all they have known for a stark new reality where the burdens 
they face have significantly increased.76 The implications of this gendered representation of a 
vulnerability hierarchy are evident in the UN agencies’ and IRC’s aid programming structure, 
and impose potentially debilitating implications on the livelihoods of Syrian women refugees, 
and the Syrian refugee population as a whole.  
This constructed hierarchy is then applied in practice as the organization utilize their won 
hierarchy to distribute resources from their aid programs. The UNHCR report implements this 
hierarchy in terms of the economic assistance it provides Syrian refugees. The report states that 
the organization offers its direct economic assistance to “the most vulnerable” Syrian female 
refugee headed-households. In Jordan, for example, UNHCR cash assistance programs are 
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directed to the ⅓ of female headed-households that were “the most vulnerable.”77 In Lebanon, 
the report states the UNHCR financial assistance program, “focuses on cash for rent or other 
short-term needs, targeting those most vulnerable.”78 However, the report provides no insight or 
explanation into how the organization procedurally and fairly defines a household in this bottom 
category. The UN Women report attributes the Syrian female refugee experience as the most 
vulnerable due to their lack of economic stability and employment prospects. Therefore, UN 
Women programs for Syrian women refugees are focused on providing increased work and 
employment prospects for women through education and job training programs, so that they may 
find diversified employment opportunities.79 However, a focus on providing increased 
employment prospects for refugees would be greatly beneficial if directed at all refugees, as 
economic insecurity is likely not solely a gendered experience. The IRC also has focused their 
aid programs for Syrian refugees based on a discursively constructed hierarchy of vulnerability 
with women at the top. For Syrian refugees in Turkey, the IRC provides cash assistance to 
“vulnerable female headed-households” with payments of up to $150 per month. The 
organization also provides these chosen females with an opportunity to participate in a group 
discussion curriculum on how to to make financial decisions.80 However, similar to the UNHCR 
report, the IRC report provides no technical definition to how they define certain households as 
“vulnerable,” and therefore more deserving of assistance, over others. The absence of a technical 
definition is significant because it allows for provision of aid to individuals whom the 
organizations deem worthy, without a wider context or view of trauma and vulnerability based 
on particular experiences. Therefore, vulnerable population groups other than Syrian women 
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refugees, are easily forgotten silenced, and left out of structural support provision due to this 
imposed hierarchy of vulnerability.  
I argue a narrow representation of human security and vulnerability discourse in Resolution 
1325 that classifies vulnerability into a rigid, hierarchical structure contributes to why suffering 
of Syrian refugee populations continue for two reasons. One reason is that this hierarchy of 
vulnerability structures aid provision and assistance to be distributed in a correspondingly 
controlled and gendered way that disregards concern for alternate suffering contexts and 
populations. By discursively placing Syrian women refugees as the most vulnerable among those 
affected by the Syrian conflict, the aid and support that follows is thereby justifiably narrowed to 
focus specifically on alleviating the suffering of women. This practice continues systemic 
suffering among the general Syrian refugee population because it permits and implements a 
limited scope of aid provision that disregards broader contexts of vulnerability and suffering. 
Therefore, significant numbers of the refugee population are deprived of sufficient aid that would 
improve their livelihoods. Without a broader concern for the context of suffering, or recognizing 
the existence of suffering in a more egalitarian way, suffering among Syrian refugee populations 
continues to exist and is exacerbated.  
Another reason why policy representations that frame vulnerability as a gendered hierarchy 
contribute to incomplete acknowledgements of suffering in a way that allows such suffering to 
confine because classifying women as the “most vulnerable” cohort decontextualizes 
vulnerability to a singular sensation that can be compared across populations and contexts. 
However, simplifying vulnerability in a way that permits its comparison among and across 
demographic groups is morally and ethically inappropriate. Experiences of vulnerability and 
trauma are highly individualized, so, it is unfair to prioritize and discuss certain populations of 
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refugees as experiencing heightened vulnerability when, in reality, all are experiencing personal 
and unique vulnerabilities, trauma, and stresses. Therefore, vulnerability is a personalized 
sensation that should not be measured in comparison to the decontextualized, broadly applied 
understanding of vulnerability and insecurity that the Resolution’s discourse and framings 
encourage. This framing of vulnerability continues widespread suffering of Syrian refugee 
populations because it refuses to recognize the complexities of insecurity that arise among all 
demographic groups of Syrian refugees and the variety of contexts in which these insecurities 
can arise. Therefore, it is both morally and practically problematic to place certain vulnerabilities 
and experiences as “more vulnerable” over others, when these vulnerabilities would likely be 
better off constructed as different. Constructing them as different would create the space needed 
to adequately and justly recognize the complex and myriad of vulnerabilities experienced by the 
Syrian refugee population beyond the gendered hierarchy that is currently present. 
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Chapter 4 
Structural Silencing Outside of UN Discourses on the Syrian Conflict 
In addition to identifying explicit representations of human security and vulnerability tied to 
UNSC Resolution 1325 discourse found in publications to characterize narratives of Syrian 
women refugees, discourse analysis also requires examination into what representations are 
implicitly suggested, ignored, and silenced that still contribute to the context of suffering. While 
human security and vulnerability discourse from UNSC Resolution 1325 invoke explicit 
representations that raise awareness to the debilitating circumstances and challenges faced by 
Syrian women refugees, there are also frameworks discursively constructed by the Resolution 
that manipulate understandings or outright overshadow awareness to the experiences of Syrian 
refugee men or the responsibility of international powers in the conflict. Shedding light on these 
silenced frameworks encouraged by UNSC Resolution 1325 through its human security and 
vulnerability discourse is necessary because it grapples with explaining how the policy leaves a 
significant amount of civilian suffering and persistent violence in the face of USC Resolution 
1325.  
4.1 Violent Refugee and Host Community Men 
Informed by UN human security and vulnerability discourses, a framing that constructs 
refugee and host community men as generally aggressive, violent, and dominating in opposition 
to vulnerable and defenseless female refugees is permitted and justified. As examined earlier, 
UNSC Resolution 1325 was established out of approaches to security and vulnerability that 
adopted a gendered focus. As a whole, UNSC Resolution 1325 calls specifically for aid 
responses to recognize the particular trauma and vulnerabilities faced by women post-conflict.81 
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The Resolution makes no reference to any particular trauma or distresses from armed conflict 
that may harmfully affect the wellbeing of men, thereby promoting an implicit converse 
assumption that men either do not experience these vulnerabilities, or that they experience 
trauma significantly less than women. The Resolution’s human security and vulnerability 
discourse implies an assumption that women are solely victims in conflict zones, and 
subsequently allows for representations to implicitly arise about men that suggest a binary 
opposite: that men are the perpetrators of violence who contribute to women’s insecurity. The 
Resolution and its related gendered discourse encourages a representation of men in the 
examined reports as the perpetrators of violence and harassment who contribute primarily to 
women’s sense of insecurity. 
Across the three reports, references to Syrian refugee men were made in terms of their 
presupposition to inflict violence, harassment, or sexual assault toward refugee women. The 
UNHCR report tells the stories of Syrian women refugees who were abused by their husbands, 
but “accepted it only because [they] did not know where else to go.”82 The UN Women report 
also describes the source of female vulnerability to violence arising from men. The report 
discusses instances of violence toward women solely in terms of physical domestic violence at 
the hands of husbands, brothers, and other male figures.83 The IRC report follows similar 
framing, and attempts to contextualize male violence as a symptom of stress, frustration, and 
instability in moving and adapting to a new environment. The report attributes physical and 
emotional violence from husbands as coping with the trauma of conflict, inability to fulfill their 
traditional role as the family provider, frustrated by lack of privacy to engage in sexual relations 
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with their wives, or a constant concern over meeting basic needs for the household.84 Overall, 
when Syrian male refugees were referenced in the examined reports on the experiences of Syrian 
female refugees, they were largely constructed as violent, aggressive, and hostile beings who 
escalated women’s senses of insecurity and vulnerability. 
Aggressive representations of men in these reports are not solely limited to Syrian refugee 
men. The reports also construct host community men as equally violent and manipulative by 
describing ways that host community men are perceived to take advantage of Syrian women 
refugees and girls. The UNHCR report tells stories of girls who are persuaded to enter into 
marriages very young with older partners out of perceived economic necessity. The partners in 
this case refer to host country men who are described as wanting to “take advantage of cheap and 
easy” Syrian refugees.85 However, the report states that marriages created on the principal of an 
unequal power relationship subsequently increases a possibility for domestic violence inflicted 
on the female.86 The UN Women report tells similar stories of Syrian teenage girl refugees 
persuaded into marriage with older host community men in exchange for financial income. In 
doing so, the report describes cases of non-Syrian men coming into camps to “shop for brides.”87 
In these representations, the men initiating these marriages are portrayed as wanting to take 
advantage of vulnerable refugee women in authoritative, emotionless, and violent ways. 
Therefore, similar to Syrian refugee men, host community men are discursively framed in an 
aggressive and violence way that construct them as another source for Syrian women refugees’s 
vulnerabilities. 
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By constructing gender groups in opposition to one another, men are constructed as the 
central origin and reason for why female refugees are experiencing their particular vulnerabilities 
and insecurity. This framing is problematic because it dismisses men as inherently violent and 
aggressive toward women, and, therefore, as undeserving of international support and aid. The 
UNHCR report specifically calls for a need to expand opportunities for women’s economic 
growth and social participation.88 The IRC similarly focuses their programs to value the 
perspectives of women.89 However, recommendations such as these limit and exclude 
opportunities that could be created to support all refugees, especially if there were programs that 
could alleviate the previously described violent coping strategies used by husbands who feel 
heightened stress when trying to provide for their family in their new setting.  
A narrow representation of Syrian refugee men reduces them to violent and aggressive 
beings contributes in two ways to why widespread suffering of Syrian refugee populations, both 
men and women, continue. The first is that UNSC Resolution 1325’s limited discourse on human 
security and vulnerability construct a limited, violent representation of men in such a way that 
any possibility of additional, complex hardships being faced by Syrian refugee males or host 
country populations is ignored. For example, it is likely that there are deeper reasons behind why 
some of these men turn to violence as an outlet for frustration and stress, and it is necessary to 
consider what those may be rather than unfairly villainizing men as agents of gender violence, 
and subsequently as undeserving of assistance. However, by ignoring Syrian refugee men in aid 
and support programs that would address their psychological needs, any potential to 
comprehensively address suffering and violence against women, which is the Resolution’s 
ultimate substantive goal, will be consistently curtailed. Secondly, and on a broader scale, a 
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discursive disregard to approach suffering in conflict zones comprehensively, regardless of 
gender, limits the potential to recognize and understand widespread suffering that exists among 
all citizens in post-conflict contexts. Therefore, due to a lack of critical recognition into the full 
context of suffering and suffering, UNSC Resolution 1325’s narrow discourse leaves a 
significant amount of suffering in place by failing to acknowledge its existence amount Syrian 
refugee male populations and host community men.  
4.2 Silenced Refugee Men 
Another representation of men that the UN’s gendered human security and vulnerability 
discourses allow is an overshadowing of Syrian refugee men’s particular experiences and 
vulnerabilities. This silencing is a direct consequence of UNSC 1325’s policy discourse that puts 
particular weight, visibility, and credibility on the experiences of women in conflict zones, thus 
rendering any experiences outside of this frame of reference as secondary, irrelevant, or 
nonexistent. In its text, UNSC Resolution 1325 makes no explicit statements about 
vulnerabilities incurred by men during or post armed conflict. Additionally, there are no UN 
Resolutions or other UN policies that give as much visibility, weight, or specificity to 
insecurities that arise for men who have experienced armed conflict, when compared to those for 
women. Without political recognition of this particular population of civilians, Syrian refugee 
men’s experiences and need for support in conflict zones are largely disregarded and silenced in 
reporting done by UN agencies and the IRC. Therefore, aid programming and assistance that is 
informed by UNSC Resolution 1325’s discourse on human security and vulnerability fails to 
address a comprehensive view of suffering excludes the plight of Syrian refugee males, which 
ultimately allows suffering to continue structurally for the widespread Syrian refugee population.  
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Representations of Syrian refugee men outside of the previously examined frame that 
constructs refugee men as violent aggressors toward Syrian female refugees are nonexistent 
across the three reports. Recently, however, the IRC has attempted to uproot and challenge this 
silencing by publishing a groundbreaking report in January 2016. Titled, “Vulnerability 
Assessment of Syrian Refugee Men in Lebanon,” the report illuminates how aid agencies have 
forgotten and overlooked single Syrian refugee men and sheds light on experiences and 
narratives that speak to their, otherwise not documented, hardships by looking, particularly, at 
the livelihoods of Syrian male refugees living in Lebanon. The report challenges the previously 
examined monolithic representation that constructs Syrian male refugees as violent actors by 
providing alterative representations of Syrian male refugees who are in need of psychological 
support, who face threats to their personal safety, and who are subjected to discrimination in 
their host community. By explicitly discussing these hardships, the report demonstrates how UN 
human security and vulnerability discourses have structurally overlooked and ignored the plight 
of Syrian refugee men. 
One of the structurally silenced representations exposed by the IRC in their reporting on the 
experiences of insecurity felt by Syrian refugee men notes males’ lack of access to necessary 
psychological and emotional support after fleeing the conflict. The report recognizes that refugee 
men are widely presumed as the group best able to self-protect, self-sustain, and negotiate the 
complexities of displacement unaided.90 However, this misconception arises simply because 
male refugee experiences are just not addressed in UN policy informed representations of Syrian 
refugee vulnerability. Therefore, necessary aid and support for these men is subsequently 
forgotten. A perception of being less vulnerable ignores the importance for single Syrian refugee 
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men to still have access to emotional and psychological support, as they also face immense 
hardship in coping with displacement and the trauma of conflict. However, due to being 
overlooked and disregarded by aid agencies, these men appear to not have access to critical 
spaces where they would receive necessary support to feel safe in their new community.91  
A disregard for isolated Syrian male refugees by UN human security and vulnerability 
discourses has detrimental implications that can easily continue on as ignored. Without access to 
emotional and psychosocial support, these males’ sense of agency, self-empowerment, and 
capacity to feel personal self-efficacy is severely hindered. It is necessary to recognize that such 
stressful and traumatic environments that are universally taxing, both emotionally and 
physically, regardless of any status-based categorization. Yes, the particular difficulties and 
challenges faced by each individual vary. However, it is important to simultaneously 
acknowledge an overall need for support arises for the entire Syrian refugee population in 
general. 
Another structurally silenced representation of Syrian male refugees’ experiences within 
UNSC Resolution 1325’s narrow and gendered human security discourse is their particular 
susceptibility to violence and instances of crime in a host country setting. Due to this lack of 
recognition, Syrian refugee men are commonly perceived as security or criminal risks by host 
country communities. The IRC report found that refugee men face disproportionate and 
aggressive targeting by governments and host community members. Two out of every three 
refugee men in that the IRC surveyed reported experiencing threats to their personal safety, with 
more than half of that group identifying the threats as constant or frequent.92 The range of threats 
include raids, arrests, arbitrary checkpoints, and instances of verbal or physical aggression. These 
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threats were reported as appearing predominantly from Lebanese authorities, with majority of the 
remainder reporting host community members also as frequent sources of threats, violence, and 
crime.93 UNSC Resolution 1325 structurally silences possible instances of violence and 
vulnerability faced by Syrian male refugees due to the policy’s limited approach to human 
security and vulnerability.  
The implication of this silencing allows perceptions of Syrian refugee men as security and 
criminal risks in host communities to flourish without question. Without discursive policy 
recognition from the UN, these refugee men subsequently find themselves within a climate 
where discrimination, exploitation, and limited livelihood opportunities for them are justified 
with impunity. Since the primary source of their insecurity was reported as coming from the 
authorities, Syrian refugee men subsequently do not report instances of discrimination or crimes 
committed against them because they lack confidence that they will be treated fairly.94 The 
frequency of threats to personal security create an omnipresent cloud of insecurity for these 
refugee men that UNSC Resolution 1325’s human security and vulnerability discourse fails to 
recognize. Without recognition toward violence and particular experiences of Syrian refugee 
males, adequate measures to support their protection and rehabilitation are silenced, forgotten, 
and ignored. 
These two framings of Syrian refugee males invoked by the IRC raise awareness about 
significant silences invoked by UNSC Resolution 1325’s discourse on human security and 
vulnerability. It is evident that this policy and its discourse fails to recognize the experiences and 
vulnerabilities of refugee men. A failure to construct policy discourse around comprehensive 
assessments of civilian experiences and suffering is a structural decision that explains why 
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widespread suffering continues to persist for Syrian civilians after they have fled the physical, 
geographic location of violence. The existing policy discourse on human security and 
vulnerability for those in conflict zones is insufficient because its documents and policies 
manipulate, silence, and disregard the needs of entire cohorts of suffering individuals. 
Furthermore, the combination of violent representations of Syrian refugee men and the structural 
silencing of their alternative, humanizing experiences can justify sentiments that permit active 
exclusion of the Syrian male refugee population from any form of international aid and support. 
Together, these silenced representations have the potential to villainize the Syrian male 
population into a dangerous representation where the population is indisputably dehumanized. 
This is why we, as an international audience who care about populations made vulnerable by 
armed conflict, continue to see civilian suffering post-conflict, despite the existence of discourses 
and policies that rhetorically promise to address it. 
4.3 Neutralized International Complicity 
A final framework that is absent, but structurally important in order to fully recognize the 
experiences and vulnerabilities of Syrian refugees, is a critical discussion about core conditions 
that created the context of the Syrian conflict as it is seen today. A disregard within these reports 
to openly discuss and examine the spiral of violence that led up to the conditions of 
displacement, poverty, and insecurity that the reports examine is a direct consequence of UN 
human security and vulnerability discourses. The content of UNSC Resolution 1325 does not call 
for examination into what root causes led to the conflict that created insecurities and 
vulnerabilities for women in the first place. Rather, its discourse and policy focus is directed to 
the women themselves that are within that specific conflict. By not making space in the 
Resolution’s discourse to recognize or address the core context of a conflict, resulting 
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frameworks that utilize this policy discourse do not take a critical approach to consider the 
multitude of forces that led the conflict to spiral and create such the extreme insecurity and 
vulnerability for civilian populations. The frameworks fail to ask why does the violence that 
preceded and caused these conditions of trauma exist. By avoiding this critical rhetoric, the 
resulting reports, instead, portray a sense of normalcy and acceptance toward the existence of 
conflict. 
The reports solely serve to document what life is like for Syrian female refugees and discuss 
the ways in which they are responding and navigating their new environments, stresses, and 
responsibilities. While discussions that work to illustrate the lived, daily struggles of refugee 
women to a wider, international audience are important for raising awareness, they also support a 
context that ignores what initial, violent conditions brought about these severe circumstances. 
The reports, informed by UNSC Resolution 1325 policy discourse, adopt a framework that 
simply portrays a sense of the lifestyles and struggles felt by Syrian female refugees without a 
critique of why such horrific lived experiences such as sexual violence, harassment, and 
insufficient aid occur in the first place. The UNHCR report provides worrying snapshots into 
Syrian women refugees’s new lives living in tents, collective shelters, or apartments that are in 
poor condition, tells stories of girls forced into early marriages, and recounts scenes of violence 
directed at these at women.95 The UN Women report takes a similar approach that is narrowly 
focused on the narrative of being a female refugee. The report focus primarily on threats of 
sexual violence, insecurity, and human rights abuses that Syrian female refugees experience.96 
The IRC report takes an explicit approach and classifies feelings of insecurity, threats of sexual 
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violence, and economic instability as these women’s “new normal” and their new “day-to-day.”97 
However, absent from these reports is any critical discussion of the Syrian civil war that engages 
with or recognizes any of the international activity that has expanded the civil war into the life-
alternating conflict it has become.  
The implication of UNSC Resolution 1325’s permission to not critically address the context 
that has brought such debilitating lived conditions for Syrian refugees unfairly decontextualizes 
the multitude of intersecting sources that has exacerbated and permitted of their suffering. 
Chapter 2 described the complex involvement that various international actors have had in 
transforming the original 2011 uprising into a gruesome civil war. However, UN human security 
and vulnerability discourses are constructed to solely focus on conditions created by armed 
conflict and their implications on civilian populations. In doing so, the organization strategically 
bypass uncomfortable conversations about international complicity in allowing this deadly, 
debilitating conflict to continue. Without adequate concern for the contexts and structural forces 
that have contributed to the Syrian civil war, any productive attempts to reach a stable, long-term 
peace for Syria are actively hindered. While it is important to discuss strategies that provide aid 
and support for those whose lives have becomes permanently altered, with a hope that they will 
thrive in life once again, it is equally important to keep sight and be critical of the structural 
conditions that brought about this situation of war and suffering in the first place. 
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Chapter 5 
Moving Forward in Solidarity 
5.1 Brief Summary and Future Possibilities 
Overall, this thesis was concerned with the problem that despite UN policy documents that 
propose commitment and action to end female suffering imposed by armed conflict, suffering 
continues to occur for the Syrian refugee population. I argue this persistence of suffering can be 
contributed to the ways in which the UN has constructed, established, and disseminated human 
security and vulnerability discourses about civilians in conflict zones, with a particular policy 
focus on UNSC Resolution 1325. This policy’s discourse has informed representations of 
civilian experiences in conflict zones within a narrow, gendered framework. Through examining 
both explicit framings and implicit silences, I observed a multitude of representations 
constructed about the Syrian refugee population that were informed by the Resolution’s human 
security and vulnerability discourse. While some of the representations of Syrian women 
refugees were argued to have dual effective and limiting implications in their attempts to 
alleviate suffering for women, I argue UNSC Resolution 1325’s limited discourse is, in fact, 
perpetuating Syrian refugee suffering. Therefore, I argue, a true needs-based prioritization and 
targeting of responses must be based on a comprehensive assessment of the protection context, 
rather than equating vulnerability with particular groups or demographic categories.  
It was noted in the introduction that a methodological limitation of a single case-study 
approach was that its conclusions could not be applied outside of the context of the particular 
being examined. Therefore, my analysis and conclusions as they stand are only applicable to the 
Syrian refugee population residing in neighboring Arab World countries. However, in the future, 
it would be worthwhile to apply a similar theoretical approach regarding UN human security and 
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vulnerability discourses to other conflict-affected populations in order to examine and analyze 
what explicit representations arise and what structural silences go unacknowledged. With this 
analysis, the representations and silences could be used to make comparisons across multiple 
conflict contexts in order to see if trends on policy-invoked representations or silencing emerge. 
Additionally, it could be worthwhile to apply this analytical approach to conflicts that have not 
garnered as much public or media attention as the Syrian conflict has. Policy silencing in lesser 
known contexts could look different and have different implications than in more highly visible 
conflicts. Overall, the framework for analysis used in this thesis could be applicable to 
disentangling structural and systemic conditions of suffering imposed on civilian populations in 
armed conflict zones.  
5.2 Recommendations for Dialogue 
Studying discursively informed representations, as this thesis has done, has illuminated a 
critical need for international policies to be constructed in a way that goes beyond a limited or 
narrow focus, and recognize the broader relationship of people in the world and with the world.  
When considering how a more interpersonal and comprehensive assessment can be performed 
for international policies to more fully acknowledge the structural and systemic complexities of 
civilian suffering post-conflict, the potential for praxis arises as an alternative. Praxis is a dual 
method of action and reflection that transforms thinking about a problem from a basic and naive 
state, to a higher level that allows leaders to perceive the causes of that reality. In its process, two 
forms of knowledge come together: the critical and theoretical knowledge of leads, with the 
empirical and reality knowledge of the people.98 Together, these forms of knowledge are 
synthesized and brought about in productive dialogue in which leaders and the people, together 
                                                
98 Paulo Freire, (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder), 110.  
 54 
as individuals, can identify with one another's narratives, experiences, and needs in a space 
where they can also pose the existence of their demand as a meaningful problem. In this dialogic 
setting, discussion of realities faced combined with specific objectives to alter that reality are 
engaged in a humanizing way with the goal of permanent liberation from suffering. 
This theory of dialogic necessity is relevant to how improvements can be made in UNSC 
Resolution 1325 discourse moving forward and future UN policy discourses on vulnerable or 
suffering populations.  A space that constructs, develops, and disseminates policies meant to 
address civilian suffering must do so in a humanistic way that can transcend pre-existing 
boundaries or hierarchies of vulnerability and human needs. I am not arguing for the UN to 
completely do away with gender-focused, or age-specific policies. Focused policies are key to 
recognizing the differences and specific needs of different demographic groups. However, a 
problem arises when the UN's discourses and policies are narrowly framed without any 
recognition toward the larger context of the problem. Dialogic processes can help remedy this by 
broadening the scope in which suffering is assessed and informing better individualized needs 
targeting. That way, the policies and needs assessments that come out of these dialogues are 
more comprehensive and justly mindful. 
5.3 Reflections on Solidarity 
The process of analyzing policy discourse promotes new possibilities in the way of 
disentangling how populations are perceived to the international community through policy and 
the implications that arise from such imaging. However, the process can also lead to frustrations 
at the risk of dehumanizing the individuals in which it is speaking about. In addition to applying 
the generalized experience of one to many, discourse gives whoever is using it the privilege to 
organize the life of another. Discourse on human rights and the experiences of those affected by 
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conflict puts their stories in the public domain, where they can readily be consumed by third-
party audiences. Such dissemination takes the personal experience of an individual further and 
further from its corporeal center, leaving the emotional significance behind one’s story easier to 
leave behind. The act of rendering and categorizing the lived experiences of individuals as 
discourse, which has been done throughout this thesis, has the potential to, unfortunately, lose 
the emotional and moralistic side of attempting to understand and support the narratives of a 
particular population in order to support, empathize, and stand in solidarity for justice. 
This uncomfortable dissonance of writing in a way that analytically analyzes and categorizes 
the experiences of another, but with the intention calling for improved advocacy and social 
justice for that population requires careful reflection on how activists build a true, and strong 
sense of solidarity. Discourse construction and dissemination can easily create a dichotomy of 
leaders with power on one side and suffering individuals on the other. However, a more 
productive form of discourse development can happen through praxis where, as described 
previously, such boundaries of identity can be crossed and the people’s empirical knowledge of 
reality fuses with leaders’ critical knowledge. A process such as this, where genuine 
communication and dialogue on a diverse range of lived experiences can be identified equally, 
fairly, and with empowerment, has the potential to lead the international community into 
effective solidarity where advocacy is motivated by a desire to act together and in recognition of 
one another as human beings. 
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